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Abstract 
We study the effects of California’s tax and expenditure limitations, especially 
Proposition 13. We ﬁnd that Proposition 13 was indeed effective at reducing both 
ad valorem property taxes per capita and total state and local taxes per capita, at 
least in the short run. We further argue that there have been unintended second-
ary effects that have resulted in an increased tax burden, undermining the aims 
of Proposition 13. To circumvent the limits imposed by Proposition 13, the state 
has drastically increased nonguaranteed debt, has privatized the public ﬁsc, and 
has devolved the authority to lay and collect taxes and to spend the proceeds so 
gained. The devolution of authority has been among the swiftest growing aspects 
of government ﬁnance in California, to a far greater extent than in other states. 
Lastly, we argue that the new tax and spending authorities that have been created to 
circumvent Proposition 13 have led to a reduction in government transparency and 
accountability and pose an increasing threat to our democracy.
Keywords: Proposition 13, initiative, tax, revenue, synthetic controls, comparative 
series, debt
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Californians have long been displeased with their government. The presence of 
the state’s largely unchecked initiative process, however, has allowed Californians 
to “[vent] their frustrations with government by drafting and passing direct initia-
tives” (Gerber et  al 2001). Only the citizens of Oregon passed more initiatives in 
the 20th century than did Californians.
Recent turns in the business cycle have accentuated Californians’ frustrations 
with their government. Indeed, despite having enacted tax and expenditure limita-
tions (TELs) in the form of Propositions 13 and 4 in 1978 and 1979, Californians 
have continued to tinker with their government’s ﬁscal institutions. Voters chose to 
amend Proposition 4 (also known as the Gann Initiative) twice, through Proposi-
tions 98 and 111. They have additionally rejected a slew of other proposals. Propo-
sition 13 has been similarly amended. Presently there are more than 50 initiatives 
circulating in California, with another dozen waiting for the attorney general to 
approve them for circulation, and with four having qualiﬁed for the ballot. Of these 
proposals, four call for constitutional conventions, six deal with taxes, one seeks 
to repeal Proposition 13 and several others seek to establish a new TEL, and three 
seek to change the state’s budget process, despite the passage in 2004 of a balanced 
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budget initiative. Given this level of activity, and with several more proposals cir-
culating in California, the question becomes how effective have these measures 
been at actually limiting taxes and expenditures?
Despite the faith voters seem to put in them, recent research on TELs suggests 
that, all else constant, they are generally ineffective in their primary goal of limit-
ing spending and/or revenues (Kousser et  al 2007, Kousser et  al 2008, McCubbins 
2008).1 There are two principal reasons for their failure. First, as is true of any ini-
tiative (see Gerber et  al 2001, 2004), TELs need to be implemented and enforced 
by the same government ofﬁcials who are the target of the limitation. This creates a 
classic agency problem and we should expect agency losses to the extent that voters 
cannot monitor the actions of the state government.2 Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) 
call this the “circumvention hypothesis.” State governments often carry out such 
circumvention by burying spending within nongermane bills, by devolving ﬁscal 
responsibility to other agents who are not subject to the limitations, by inventing 
new debt mechanisms, and by privatizing public policy.
Second, although the voters use TELs to erect obstacles to taxation, those same 
voters continue to demand increased government spending, inducing legislators 
to bypass the voters’ obstacles. There are myriad possible explanations for the ap-
parent contradiction in voters’ preferences: voters’ preferences may be changing; 
differential turnout may change the composition of the electorate in each election; 
the statewide initiative electorate may differ from the district-based constituency 
of the State Assembly and Senate; the existence of TELs may affect voters’ prefer-
ences; or voters may simply hold contradictory preferences. These are examples 
of a time-inconsistency problem facing voters who must consider choices offered 
to them on the ballot. Thus, there will be an incentive to ﬁnd a way around a TEL. 
This, in turn, causes greater citizen frustration with the legislature and further calls 
for newer and better TELs.
 In what follows, we show that California’s Proposition 13 was indeed ef-
fective at reducing both ad valorem property taxes and total state and local taxes, 
at least temporarily. We also argue that there have been insidious and unintended 
secondary effects that result in Proposition 13 being undercut. We also ﬁnd that 
the state government’s efforts to bypass Proposition 13 has been one cause of the 
increase in nonguaranteed debt, the privatization of the public ﬁsc, and the devolu-
tion of democracy in the state. We will argue further that the new tax and spending 
authorities that have been created to circumvent the strictures of Proposition 13 
have led to a reduction in government transparency and a loss of accountability. In 
our discussion, we will provide a brief history that shows how California’s ﬁscal 
landscape has changed in response to the passage of Propositions 13 and 4.
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The California Tax Revolt: Proposition 13 and Proposition 4
Californians passed Proposition 13 in June of 1978, limiting ad valorem prop-
erty taxes to 1% of the property’s assessed value, and limiting increases in assessed 
value to 2% per year. This measure, designed to prevent property taxes from pricing 
residents out of their homes, was passed by nearly a two-thirds margin and remains 
popular to this day. The years preceding the passage of Proposition 13 saw espe-
cially signiﬁcant gains in property tax revenue collected, with the share of state and 
local revenues derived from property taxes increasing from 34% at the turn of the 
decade to 44% in 1978 (Schwartz 1998). California housing prices doubled while 
income remained ﬂat in the ﬁve years leading up to passage of the initiative, so 
that many Californians, especially retirees, were at risk of being taxed out of their 
homes, This made Proposition 13 very popular. 
In 1979, Proposition 4, known as the Gann Initiative, advanced the broader 
agenda set by Proposition 13. The Gann Initiative extended limitations across all 
taxes in an effort to prevent the rapid growth in government seen in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. The Gann Initiative pegged spending to the baseline year 1979, 
and limiting budget increases each year as a function of inﬂation and population 
growth. The Gann Initiative required a tax refund to be paid out to taxpayers when 
revenues overran capped expenditures. 
Other tax limitations, which have been proposed since, have not been nearly as 
popular and most have been rejected. Indeed, Californians regularly accept increas-
es in sales taxes, charges and fees, and assessments, which are collected as part of 
a property owner’s tax bill, but are not pegged to the value of the property. Further, 
Californians regularly pass bond measures and other spending requirements on the 
state government. For example, recent bond measures committed the state to sup-
port stem cell research and build high-speed trains. 
Research Design and Data
The most common approach to testing the effect of TELs has been to assume 
that all states are the same and that all TELs are the same, and that the state ﬁ-
nances, and the passage of TELs are independent.3 Of course, states are not all the 
same. Wyoming has little in common with California and Maine is not identical to 
Florida. Similarly, Proposition 2 in Massachusetts, which limited property taxes, is 
different from TABOR in Colorado, which attempted to limit general ﬁscal policy. 
Lastly, states’ ﬁnances are often correlated, one to the other, and the passage of a 
TEL in one state often leads to the introducing of TELs in other states (see Moule 
and Weller 2009), thus violating the stable unit treatment value assumption, or 
SUTVA (see Rubin 1978).
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Existing panel studies almost always assume that a set of “control variables” 
or covariates make the subjects of these studies (states) otherwise identical. Fur-
thermore, the “treatment” in these studies is supposed to be identical, applied in an 
identical manner to these identical subjects. Of course, none of the techniques used, 
from differences-in-differences (Wooldridge 2002) to a random coefﬁcients model 
get around the fact that we do not have random assignment of subjects to treat-
ment and control, and thus cannot overcome the fundamental problems of causal 
inference (Holland and Rubin 1988). The essence of the FPCI is that we cannot, 
for example, observe ﬁscal policy in California after 1979 for both the true case, 
in which Proposition 13 was passed, and the counterfactual case where it did not 
(Sekhon 2004).
There are problems that cannot be overcome, however. SUTVA demands that all 
subjects and treatments be identical and one cannot get around the fact that the sub-
jects and treatments in these types of studies are not. Thus, there are large threats to 
conclusion validity. For example, we know from these studies that the census sends 
out a survey to the states, that different states have different ofﬁcers ﬁlling out the 
survey, and that the identiﬁcation of these ofﬁcers changes from state to state and 
in the same state over time. This is an instrumentation threat. Following the law of 
anticipated reactions (Almond and Verba 1963, Weingast 1979), state legislatures 
in one state may, after witnessing the passage of a TEL in another state, adapt 
their ﬁscal policy (or at least the reporting of their ﬁscal policy) in order to avoid a 
TEL of their own. This is a social-interaction threat. Furthermore, the state’s ﬁscal 
behavior and the passage of a TEL may be endogenous to political and economic 
conditions within the state. This is a selection-history threat. Typical methods used 
to study policy effects such as differences-in-differences (Wooldridge 2002), time-
series cross-sectional methods with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 
1995), while they have their merits, do nothing to mitigate these problems if and 
when they exist.
As such, in order to better study the effects of these measures, we will explore 
the “gold-standard” research design employed in Kousser et al. (2004, 2008) and 
suggested in the ﬁnancial literature (for a survey see MacKinlay 1997), which is a 
single state event study with a benchmark comparison (McCubbins 2008, McCub-
bins and Moule 2010) or a comparable interrupted time-series design. Before doing 
this, it is useful to see the data. 
Figure 1 displays California’s real property tax per capita. A reference line is 
added to represent the passage of Proposition 13. It is apparent in Figure 1 that there 
is, indeed, a large drop in the amount of per capita property taxes collected. This is 
consistent with our results. Notice that, although property taxes have increased over 
time, they have never caught up to their original pre-1978 level. This is an early 
indication that Proposition 13 was successful in limiting taxes.
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Figure 2, which displays the total tax revenue collected in California, shows 
a similar drop. However, unlike property taxes, that amount of total tax revenue 
catches and exceeds its pre-1978 level within the decade.
Figure 3 shows real per capita expenditures in California. Unlike the previous 
two graphs, there is no discernable drop. In fact, California’s expenditure increased 
substantially approximately six years after the implementation of Proposition 13.
Figure 4 displays the ﬁrst-differences in property taxes (that is the increases or 
decreases) per capita for California and a set of comparable states (labeled com-
parison states in Figure 4). This corroborates the evidence displayed in Figure 1 and 
accentuates the drop seen in California’s property tax collections.
By this measure, Jarvis, Gann, and company were successful, and it is this data 
that they can point to in support of their claim of effectiveness. One thing to note 
is that real property taxes per capita have still been increasing (after, of course, the 
dramatically large drop seen in 1979) at a steady rate, at some points even peaking 
above most of the comparison states.
Figure 1: Real Property Tax Per Capita in California, 1971-2000
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Figure 2: Real Total Taxes Per Capita in California, 1971-2000
Similarly, we can look at the effect of Proposition 13 on total state and local 
tax revenues. Figure 5 displays ﬁrst differences in total state and local taxes for 
California and a set of comparison states from 1971 to 2000. As was seen in Figure 
4 with respect to property taxes, we can see a huge drop in total state and local tax 
revenues in the year following the enactment of Proposition 13. Figure 6 displays 
ﬁrst differences in total state and local expenditures. There is not the same kind of 
change in this graph; indeed, it would seem that expenditures were unaffected by 
Proposition 13 (as well as Proposition 4, as there is no decline in 1980 or 1981). 
The line with the largest swing prior to 1980 is New York, which was suffering in 
the 1970s where the drop occurs. Also in evidence are the economic recovery in 
the mid-1980s and the recession and recovery in the early 1990s and late 1990s, 
respectively, although interestingly not every state seemed to share in the latter 
recovery.
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To test the null hypothesis that Proposition 13 was ineffective, we ran the fol-
lowing regression:4
 
Where t denotes the years 1971 to 2000 and ∆ signiﬁes the ﬁrst difference (for 
all of the continuous variables) from t to t-1. FB is state ﬁscal behavior (i.e., we 
use three dependent variables here, property taxes, total state and local own source 
revenue, and total state and local expenditures). Prop.13 is a dummy variable rep-
resenting the effective range of Proposition 13. We test two forms of the effect 
of Proposition 13. We ﬁrst test the immediate effects for the year following the 
implementation of the limit (thus Prop.13 is zero for all years except the ﬁrst one 
following the implementation of the Prop.13 for which it takes on a value of one). 
Second, we test the long-run effect, allowing the dummy to take on a value of zero 
before the revenue initiative is implemented and a value of one for all years suc-
Figure 3: Real Expenditure Per Capita in California, 1971-2000
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Figure 4: First Difference in Property Taxes Per Capita across a Panel of 
States, 1971-2000 
Note: The line for California is in bold. All numbers are multiplied by 1x108 for graphical 
purposes.
ceeding the event. PCI is real per capita income within the state. SAP is the fraction 
of school age population (ages 5-17) and EP is the fraction of the elderly population 
(ages 65+) within the total population. HD, SD, and GD are the dummy variables 
for political party control of various parts of the government. HD is coded 1 if the 
Democratic Party has control of the state’s lower house in year t. SD is coded 1 if 
the Democratic Party has control of the state upper house. GD is coded 1 if there is 
a Democratic governor (cf. Alt and Lowry 1994, 2000, 2003).
Data was collected from the Census Bureau books “Government Finances” for 
the years 1971-1992 and from the Census Bureau website on Federal, State, and 
Local Finances (located at: <http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html>) 
for the years 1993-2000. Numbers given are divided by total population and de-
ﬂated by the implicit price deﬂator (the implicit price deﬂator is available at <http://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt>). Numbers are in millions of U.S. 
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dollars. Values for income and sales taxes are not differentiated from total tax rev-
enue until 1973, so there are fewer observations for these variables. Values for the 
year 1978 for these variables were unavailable so values are interpolated. In order 
to help correct for nonstationarity that is typical of economic data, we employ ﬁrst 
differences on all budget variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1998). 
In our ﬁrst cut at the data we estimate Equation (1) by ordinary least squares 
(OLS).5 Table 1 displays the estimated coefﬁcient, associated p-values, and 95-per-
cent conﬁdence intervals for the effect of the Proposition 13 dummy variables, as 
well as the adjusted R-squared statistic for the regression. As can be seen in Table 
1, Proposition 13 did lead to signiﬁcant decline in property taxes and total state and 
local taxes for the year following its implementation. Since our ﬁscal and economic 
variables are all ﬁrst-differences, we would only expect a change in these variables 
to be signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst year after the implementation of the policy, as after 
Figure 5: First Difference in Total State and Local Tax Revenues Per Capita 
across Panel of States, 1971-2000
Note: The line for California is in bold. All numbers multiplied by 1x108 for graphical pur-
poses.
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Figure 6: First-Difference in Total State and Local Expenditures Per Capita 
across Panel of States
Note: The line for California is in bold. All numbers multiplied by 1x108 for graphical pur-
poses.
that, growth in income and population will lead to a linear growth in revenues again 
and thus the post-Proposition 13 mean (of the ﬁrst differences) would be roughly 
equal to the pre-Proposition 13 mean, if taken over a long enough time period in 
which no other major shocks occurred. Expenditures were not cut, leading us to 
believe that the effect we see here is caused by Proposition 13 and not Proposition 
4, since Proposition 4 also aimed to cut government spending and, if it was success-
ful, we should also see an effect on expenditures, which we do not. The evidence 
for this can be seen in Figure 3.
The analysis in Table 1 is a single state event study, not a comparable time se-
ries. In what follows we will make use of data from comparison states that never 
enacted a TEL and could not enact a TEL through the popular initiative. We exclude 
states that have the popular initiative even if they have not enacted a TEL, follow-
ing the logic of Gerber (1999) and Lupia and Matsusaka (2004), we believe there 
could be a possible intent to treat effect, as the threat of the initiative process could 
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sway the legislatures to limit their ﬁscal policies even without a TEL. Our compari-
son group, then, includes Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, Louisiana, Tennessee, 
Indiana, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, West Virginia, Virginia, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New 
Hampshire. We drop Alabama and Michigan, as they have legislatively enacted 
TELs. Our selection of comparison states could be seen as analogous to Snow’s 
seminal study of cholera in England. In the study, he found that there was a higher 
concentration of cholera cases in locations in London served by a company that 
drew their water from the Thames River downstream. Residents did not know what 
part of the river their water was drawn from, due to piping, so it was as if random. 
Our study is analogous to Snow’s in the sense that each state is susceptible to hav-
ing a TEL passed, similar to how each person is susceptible to contracting cholera. 
However, states with the initiative process are much more susceptible to contrac-
tion than noninitiative states. Thus, in order to make a control group, we focus on 
the group that is least susceptible.
Table 1: OLS Regression of Proposition 13 on Three Fiscal Behaviors (Prop-
erty Taxes, Total State and Local Expenditures, and Total State and Local 
Taxes)
Proposition 13–Dummy Variable Denoting One Year Following  
the Tax Limitation 
Type
Effect (Test 
Statistic and  
P value) 95% Conﬁdence Interval R-Squared
Property Tax -12.57 (0.000) (-639.1534, -458.1001) 0.8990
Expenditure -1.47 (0.155) (-828.3228, 140.2498) 0.2761
Total Tax -6.59 (0.000) (-778.406,  -405.8877) 0.7909
Proposition 13–Dummy Variable for Fiscal Years 1979 to 2000 
Type
Effect (Test 
Statistic and  
P value)
95% Conﬁdence Interval R-Squared
Property Tax 1.57 (0.131) (-23.69392, 170.1883) 0.2570
Expenditure 1.80 (0.085) (-24.37188, 349.6884) 0.3071
Total Tax 0.71 (0.487) (-82.6923, 168.154) 0.3401
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We use a subset of our observations on these 19 states from ﬁscal year 1971 to 
ﬁscal year 2000 to construct a synthetic control for California. That is, we construct 
a counterfactual or synthetic estimation of California’s ﬁscal behaviors that we hope 
matches closely the Golden State’s ﬁscal behavior had it not enacted Proposition 
13. We provide two robustness checks of the synthetic control data:6 ﬁrst, we mea-
sure how closely the synthetic control comports with the actual ﬁscal behaviors of 
our treated case—California—prior to the treatment; and second, considering the 
covariates listed in Equation (1) above, we measure covariate balance between the 
synthetic control or estimated counterfactual and the factual data from California’s 
real history. Our synthetic control weights each true observation among the com-
parison states so that they reconstruct the true observation in the pre-test treated 
case (e.g., California before Proposition 13).
In Figure 7 we plot the actual changes in California’s property taxes against the 
synthetic control. The algorithm used to construct the synthetic control is estimated 
Figure 7: Changes in California Property Taxes vs. Synthetic Control
Note: All numbers are multiplied by 1x108 for graphical purposes.
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from the pretest observations. Notice how closely the synthetic control matches the 
actual data prior to the passage of Proposition 13. The effect of Proposition 13 can 
be seen by the large difference between the synthetic control and the actual changes 
in property taxes in 1979. The error between the counterfactual synthetic control 
and the actual value for the change in property taxes in 1979 is much larger than 
any other error in the time series. The sharp decline for 1979 is, in fact, far larger 
than any year-state observation for any of the time series. Indeed, we do a very 
good job of estimating the ﬁscal behavior of any of the comparison states as well as 
the treated state, California. 
Table 2 provides some insight into the estimate of the synthetic control and how 
well it approximated California’s property taxes. First, the Mean Squared Predic-
tion Error (MSPE) of 40.447 between California and its comparison state appears 
to be driven mainly by the very steep drop in the changes in the property tax vari-
able immediately post-treatment. The other thing to notice in Table 2 are that the 
covariate values for the treated (actual) and synthetic (estimated) cases are very 
nearly identical for the pre-test period, giving further evidence that the synthetic 
control is an appropriate case for comparison to California. Lastly, notice the unit 
weights given to the comparable series for changes in property taxes. Only North 
Carolina and New York have nonzero weights and of these two, nearly 92 percent 
of the weight goes on the New York observations, which makes sense because Cali-
fornia property taxes have little in common with Iowa’s or Minnesota’s. 
There could be several reasons for the pattern seen in Figure 7: First, there 
could have been a change in the manner of assessment. Property taxes in Califor-
nia are ad valorem, meaning that the amount taxed is based on the assessed value 
of the property upon which the tax is levied. One of the stipulations placed on the 
government by Proposition 13 was that these assessments were to occur only upon 
acquisition or transaction of property and then this assessed rate was to increase by 
either the inﬂation rate or two percent, whichever was lower. This turned Califor-
nia’s property tax base from “assessed value” to “acquisition value” (even though 
property is still technically assessed upon acquisition). This, however, had several 
unintended consequences.
Second, Proposition 13 could have created a “lock-in effect” among Califor-
nia homeowners. Scholars have argued that the acquisition value system changes 
the incentives for homebuyers. Proposition 58, which allows children to inherit 
their parent’s Proposition 13 assessments, and Proposition 60, which allows senior 
citizens to transfer their assessments to their new houses when they move (with 
certain restrictions), further changed incentives. While Stohls et al. (2001) attribute 
the lock-in effect to Proposition 13, Wasi and White (2005) attribute lock-in to the 
widespread adoption of rent control in California cities in the wake of Proposition 
13. Another beneﬁt to the acquisition value system in place under Proposition 13 
13
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Table 2: Synthetic Control Outputs – Property Taxes
RMPSE: 40.447
Predictor Balance
Treated Synthetic
School Age Population -0.013 -0.008
Elderly Population 0.005 .004
Per Capita Income 104582.3 9437.126
Governor Dummy 1 .959
House    Control .5 .486
Senate Control .5 .459
Unit Weights
Covariate Unit Weight
Georgia 0
Indiana 0
Iowa 0
Kansas 0
Louisiana 0
Massachusetts 0
Minnesota 0
New Hampshire 0
New Jersey 0
New York 0.918
North Carolina 0.082
Pennsylvania 0
Rhode Island 0
South Carolina 0
Tennessee 0
Texas 0
Vermont 0
Virginia 0
West Virginia 0
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has been the aforementioned revenue stability. Cal Tax Digest7 notes that this as-
sessment system creates an environment under which property tax revenues are 
inherently stable, even in the face of economic downturn. This is because these as-
sessments do not occur annually, or even regularly. Consequently, there is no way 
to capture the effect of a recession in housing prices, as they remain pegged to their 
baseline. There is, almost, no way to go but up.
Figure 8 shows changes in total state and local tax revenues in California. The 
ﬁgure seems similar to Figure 7, with a steep drop in 1979 followed by ups and 
downs since. Although the drop in total revenues in 1979 is not quite as dramatic 
as the drop in property tax revenues shown in Figure 7, there is a large effect of 
Proposition 13 in 1979 when actual changes in total taxes are compared to the 
counterfactual level derived from the comparison group. As shown in Table 3, the 
synthetic controls were, again, largely derived by reference to ﬁscal behavior in 
New York. The regressions show very strong covariate balance between California 
and the synthetic control.
Figure 8: California Total State and Local Taxes vs. Synthetic Control
Note: All numbers are multiplied by 1x108 for graphical purposes.
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Table 3: Synthetic Control Outputs – Total Taxes
RMPSE: 83.655
Predictor Balance
Treated Synthetic
School Age Population -0.013 -0.008
Elderly Population 0.005 0.004
Per Capita Income 104582.3 8829.502
Governor Dummy 1 .988
House    Control .5 .496
Senate Control .5 .488
Unit Weights
Covariate Unit Weight
Georgia 0
Indiana 0
Iowa 0
Kansas 0
Louisiana 0
Massachusetts 0
Minnesota 0
New Hampshire 0
New Jersey 0
New York .975
North Carolina .025
Pennsylvania 0
Rhode Island 0
South Carolina 0
Tennessee 0
Texas 0
Vermont 0
Virginia 0
West Virginia 0
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In contrast to the marked drop in revenues shown in Figures 5 and 6, Figure 9 
suggests that there was no signiﬁcant drop in state spending. Indeed, spending lev-
els for the synthetic control almost exactly match those of California. The statistical 
results can be seen in Table 4. In this case we achieve near perfect covariate balance 
and our synthetic measures are based on only one state, New York. 
The Fiscal Shell Game
The results in the previous section show a much greater effect for Proposition 
13 than much of the previous literature has credited to it. Yet, given the dramatic 
decrease in property taxes and total state and local revenue, how did spending con-
tinue to increase? There are several ways that the state and local governments have 
changed the revenue landscape in order to accommodate the revenue losses caused 
by Proposition 13.
Figure 9: California Total State and Local Expenditure vs. Synthetic Control
Note: All numbers are multiplied by 1x108 for graphical purposes.
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Table 4: Synthetic Controls – Total State and Local Expenditures
RMPSE: 92.107
Predictor Balance
Treated Synthetic
School Age Population -0.013 -0.008
Elderly Population 0.005 0.004
Per Capita Income 104582.3 8563
Governor Dummy 1 1
House    Control .5 .5
Senate Control .5 .5
Unit Weights
Covariate Unit Weight
Georgia 0
Indiana 0
Iowa 0
Kansas 0
Louisiana 0
Massachusetts 0
Minnesota 0
New Hampshire 0
New Jersey 0
New York 1
North Carolina 0
Pennsylvania 0
Rhode Island 0
South Carolina 0
Tennessee 0
Texas 0
Vermont 0
Virginia 0
West Virginia 0
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Since it is apparent that Proposition 13 was successful in its design, there might 
be a rush to extend the measure’s capabilities at the least and, at the most, pass a 
whole new initiative to further limit the government’s ability to raise revenue. After 
all, if it worked once, why wouldn’t it work again? Today’s recession together with 
California’s budget crisis have made tax limitations all the more appealing. The 
question remains, thus, should the public vote to pass another one of these initia-
tives or should further measures be adopted in a constitutional convention? Our 
answer is no. First, there is substantial evidence similar to what we just presented 
that most TELs do not have the intended effects (Kousser et al. 2007, Kousser et al. 
2008, McCubbins and Moule 2010). Second, even when those effects are achieved, 
there are other implementation problems. It is those that we will discuss here.
We mentioned previously that state voters face two problems related to imple-
menting their enacted policies: time-inconsistency and agency loss. Despite their 
ability to recognize the evils of higher taxes, polls indicate that the public still 
prefers to increase government services. In polls conducted since the passage of 
Proposition 13, Californians have routinely expressed a desire for an ever-increas-
ing level of government services.
Given the time-inconsistency with respect to voters ﬁscal demands, how can 
state legislators provide people with the services that they seem to want without 
simultaneously increasing taxes? It was obviously still politically favorable to pro-
vide these services.
Proposition 13 undercut the ability of local governments to set property tax 
rates (Shapiro and Sonstelie 1982). Grasping for revenues, municipalities turned to 
other sources of income. Many governments increased sales taxes to compensate 
for the lost property-tax revenue. The public outcry against sales taxes is not nearly 
as great as it is for property tax levies (Schwartz 1998) and it is relatively easy for 
increases in sales taxes to occur without being noticed, as sales taxes increase lin-
early with per capita income. By raising sales tax, the local governments were able 
keep their revenue high while upholding the letter of the law that limited property 
tax rates. This tax substitution allowed them to circumvent the obstacles erected by 
Proposition 13 (Kousser et al. 2008). Notice in Figure 8 the ﬁrst difference in total 
taxes appears to increase slightly over time, especially in the more recent years.
Municipalities also sought to increase their sales tax bases through the ﬁscal-
ization of land-use policy. In many cities, planning became a mad dash to attract 
automotive dealerships, shopping malls and strip malls by offering favorable tracts 
of land along main roads. Sales-tax farming has led to the erosion of family owned 
“Ma and Pa” shops that do not generate nearly the same sales-tax receipts as do 
department stores and auto malls. Thus the state and local governments are cul-
tivating, planting, and harvesting their own growth in available revenue, just as 
they rode the bubble in real estate. Indeed, Schwartz (1998) notes that the sales tax 
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as a portion of city general funds increased from 15.54% prior to the passage of 
Proposition 13 to 26.85% after.8 Redevelopment has made these land-grab policies 
even easier for cities. Under the pretext that certain neighborhoods or buildings are 
“blighted,” cities can trigger sweeping neighborhood reforms in which old, worn 
out buildings are demolished to make way for polished, new malls.
While sales taxes and land grabs have received much attention in the literature, 
a subtler substitute for property taxes has grown in popularity over the past three 
decades. Charges and fees have become an integral part of the California budget-
ary landscape, especially in the wake of the Gann limit. Kousser, McCubbins, and 
Moule (2008) note that California’s proportion of fees with respect to total general 
revenue increased from 18.1% in 1969 (immediately before the passage of Proposi-
tion 13) to 31.6% by 1994. Within the group of comparison states average charges 
and fees started at 22.4%, well above California’s level, and ended at 30.9%, which 
is slightly below that of California (Kousser et al. 2008). Fees give the government 
a revenue stream that is not subject to limitation and hard for voters to track. Cit-
ies, counties, and even school districts are able to levy fees for everything from 
buildings, parks, and permits, to trafﬁc. This not only keeps the revenue from being 
limited (since it is nontax revenue), it also helps to “internalize” the costs of public 
services. It has been noted that these fees are much more numerous and cover a 
wider variety of infrastructure in more recently developed areas (Chapman 1998). 
Chapman notes that the share of service charges with respect to the total revenue 
collected increased from 6% to 11% of total revenues since the passage of Proposi-
tion 13.
Another means of circumventing Proposition 13 is the creation of assessments 
and assessment districts. While the practice of creating assessment districts was 
not initiated in California, their use in California may be unique. Eisenhorn (1991) 
wrote that, traditionally, these districts were a rejection of resource redistribution 
by the local governments: establishing a “you get what you pay for” philosophy for 
governmental services. California’s situation is different.
Similar to the proliferation of charges and fees in government revenue struc-
ture, California has seen a rise in the amount of special assessment districts and 
the amount of money raised by them since the passage of Propositions 4 and 13. 
Researchers who have studied Proposition 13’s various effects on the state budget 
landscape have found that special assessments have, indeed, grown more promi-
nent (Chapman 1998, Shires 1999, Kogan and McCubbins 2008), and these dis-
tricts are often used as a means to subvert the limitations placed on the govern-
ment. Special assessments often take the form of special charges on property that 
pay for construction, maintenance, or other public works and services. Ironically, 
property owners have to enact these assessments. Kogan and McCubbins point out 
that these are “often indistinguishable from traditional property taxes in the way 
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they are collected and paid.” However, they further point out that they are legally 
distinct because of their enactment procedures. As determined by the California 
Court of Appeals in County of Fresno v. Malmstrom 1979, a “special assessment is 
charged to real property to pay for beneﬁts that property has received from a local 
improvement and, strictly speaking, is not a tax at all.” Thus, the Census Bureau’s 
report of property taxes refers only to involuntary charges that are determined by 
the assessed value of land (i.e., ad valorem property taxes). These “special taxes” 
are similar, but are earmarked for a certain purpose, rather than for a variety of pur-
poses or for the general activities of government.
The legal status of these assessment districts as a means of paying for public 
improvements was hotly debated until the California Legislature passed the Mello-
Roos Community Facilities District Act of 1982. Despite Republican worries about 
the subversion of Proposition 13 by special assessment districts, Community Fa-
cilities Districts (CFDs) actually expanded on the authorized mandates of previous 
special assessments, allowing them to pay for a variety of public services (such as 
police and ﬁre) that had previously been covered by property taxes. In addition, 
CFDs no longer had to take into account the beneﬁts garnered by particular proper-
ties.
Kogan and McCubbins (2008) note that these assessment districts have lead to 
a “hyper-fragmenting” of California’s local governments with a steeply “layered 
democracy.” Kogan and McCubbins argue that this has had negative effects on the 
ability of citizens to monitor their agents, simply because there are so many more 
agents to look after and voters have so few tools with which to discipline their 
agents.
Proposition 13 supporters were not unaware of the potential problems created 
by CFDs and, as such, made a variety of attempts to expand the limitations of 
Proposition 13 to include these new forms of revenue. While voters rejected such 
a measure in 1984 (apparently not wanting to “save Proposition 13”), eventually, 
Proposition 218, passed in 1996, deﬁned what qualiﬁed as an assessment and re-
quired a majority vote in an election before one of these assessments could be 
levied. While this may have slowed the growth of various assessment districts, it 
has not curtailed them completely.9 It is difﬁcult to know the extent of these special 
assessments; parcel taxes are not traditional taxes. They are collected at a local 
level in California, so they are not aggregated in the data presented by the Census 
Bureau.
Yet another aspect of this circumvention is the underfunding of pensions. Take 
the City of San Diego, for example. Riding the stock market growth of the late 
1990s, the city was able to “fund” their pension system without having to make the 
required payments. This freed up money for use elsewhere in the budget, which 
council members there did as politicians would do anywhere, they used to aid their 
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reelection. This strategy, while good for council members in their campaigns, even-
tually led to massive debt problems. This story, however, is not unique to San Di-
ego; it permeates all levels of government. Indeed, the problem is not even unique 
to public pensions. One, as yet unanswered question, is the extent to which the 
underfunding of pensions is a consequence of Proposition 13, although it has been 
quite conspicuous in California.
Conclusion
Proposition 13 appears to have had a strong initial effect: it severely limited 
property tax revenues in the years following implementation of the measure. Propo-
sition 13 also limited total state and local revenue in the year following its imple-
mentation. In this sense, the initiative achieved its purpose. However, our survey of 
the literature has argued that these effects have been undercut over time, as legisla-
tors have come up with creative alternatives for government ﬁnancing, substituting 
away from the traditional ad valorem property taxes towards fees, assessments, and 
income and sales taxes. This circumvention of Proposition 13 is authorized by vari-
ous state laws but is implemented by municipal and county governments.
One of the policy lessons to learn here is that, often, these limiting initiatives 
will have a reach that extends much farther than originally anticipated. This very 
problem shapes California’s ﬁnances to this day. Voters are stuck playing in a ﬁscal 
shell game, where they must guess under which governmental shell the responsibil-
ity for policy lies. But governments demand high revenues because the people they 
serve demand a high level of government services. If voters cut their governments 
off from one source of revenue, governments will ﬁnd another source to take its 
place. The net result of this, at least in California, is a towering pyramid of various 
levels of government each with a distinctive source of revenue, some very small 
and hard to trace, others large and visible. The multiplication and stratiﬁcation of 
local governments leaves voters unable to track where their taxes go or how they 
are spent, exacerbating the agency problems inherent in political delegation. 
With tax and expenditure limits, as with any citizen initiative, the voters need 
to consider the fact that their policy preferences may not line up exactly with the 
agents they are attempting to control. Enacting initiatives and then delegating im-
plementation to these same agents could prove to be problematic.
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Notes
1 Others, however, have argued that these limitations are indeed effective. See Elder (1992), 
Shadbegian (1998), Bails and Tieslau (2000), and New (2001).
2 For more on agency problems and agency loss see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991]) Epstein 
and O’Halloran (1999).
3Abrams and Dougan 1986; Elder 1992; Shadbegian 1996; Mullins and Joyce 1996; Shad-
begian 1998; Bails and Tieslau 2000; New 2001; Mullins 2004; Mullins and Wallin 2004. These 
studies have had mixed results: some ﬁnd that TELs have produced a signiﬁcantly negative effect in 
government spending or revenue (Elder 1992, Bails and Tieslau 2000, New 2001), while some have 
found no statistically signiﬁcant effects on either part of government ﬁscal behavior (Abrams and 
Dougan 1986, Mullins and Joyce 1996). 
4   Due to the near simultaneous adoption of the two propositions, we cannot sort out the effect 
of Proposition 13 from Proposition 4 with the data and methods used here.
5   See Kousser et. et  al. 2008 for several alternative means of estimating the impact of the 
Proposition 13 “event,” on California ﬁscal behavior.   
6   It is referred to as a synthetic control in that the estimation of the counterfactual data serves 
as a baseline, or control, that approximates the untreated case.   In this analysis, the control is a mix 
of untreated states designed to approximate California without Proposition 13.
7 <http://www.caltax.org/MEMBER/digest/May98/may98-4.htm>
8 This in turn has led to the erosion of property rights, as cities have used their power of eminent 
domain to remove lower-tax property owners.
9 As mentioned above, often these CFDs or other assessment districts will levy their charges 
upon the public in terms of parcel taxes. As shown above, these taxes are based on acreage or a 
“parcel” rather than on assessed value of property and thus are not considered property taxes under 
the limitation imposed by Proposition 13. They are, however, very similar. They are, obviously, a 
tax levied on property, they are collected in a similar manner, and they have turned to paying for 
the same things that property taxes in California traditionally paid for, such as school bonds (among 
other things). Even as such, they are not calculated into the state or local level “property tax.”.
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